Let us go back to the history of controlled experimentation and quantification and natural observation and qualitative research, especially in social science and study of social phenomena. I am hoping this will help the positivistic-post-positivistic and quantitative vs. qualitative debate
In his book, the Outlines of Psychology Wundt (1896) notes that "the exact determination of the course of....any natural process [italics in original]” (p. 23), coupled with the analysis of its components, require experimental control, since precise observation is feasible only “when the observer is able to determine the exact moment at which the process shall commence” (p. 23).
Experimental control is also vital in isolating the various elements of a complex phenomenon from one another by adding and subtracting certain conditions as well as quantitatively modifying these conditions. This is precisely the technique employed by the physical/natural sciences such as chemistry, physiology and biology. Moreover, the quantitative, numeral sciences (namely, mathematics) are considered by Comte (1830) to be the ultimate, most progressive forms of science into which all disciplines should be reduced, so as to create the ultimate form of human knowledge and human progress. Eddington (1923) and Russel (1917) took the reductionist view to an extreme in their attempt to reduce all sciences to mathematics.
Mere observation, according to Wundt (1896), in contrast, enjoys the benefit of examining naturally occurred phenomena in their own environment and time of occurrence. It is, however, not feasible to control and examine with a high degree of precision “the rise and progress of these mental [processes], their composition out of different components and the interrelations of these components” (p. 24). Hence, mere observation lacks objectivity and therefore validity and reliability. Moreover, as it is not feasible to control those processes, it is by no means feasible to replicate them, with a view to observe them again and compare the two observations. Thus experiment is viewed by Wundt as the sole method for psychology, since this field deals with processes rather than permanent objects which may be observed directly.
Indeed, according to Wundt (1896), those processes have to be “varied....at will” (p. 24) and their beginnings must be “controlled” (p. 24) in order to study with a high degree of accuracy “the rise and progress of these processes, their composition out of different components and the interrelations of these components”. While this exercise is an artificial one, in an artificial environment, it provides objectivity, precision and reliability to the subjective inner experiences of the subjects. This increases the validity of empirical psychology as a scientific discipline.
Nonetheless, Wundt asserts that there are certain mental products (social, collective, processes such as language, mythological ideas and customs) which cannot be studied using this method of controlled observation, and therefore cannot be accounted for by Wundt’s system of experimental individual psychology. Indeed, those mental products are independent of the perceiver/observer, since they are of a general character which presupposes the existence of a “mental community [italics in original] composed of many individuals” (p. 26). Thus it is not feasible to control the rise and progress of those mental products of the community (which consist varied individual reports), and they can only be investigated by observation.
In contrast, Wundt consigned the studies of collective mental products to a different field, that of social psychology, which he did not consider an empirical, experimental science. He developed this view in his Elements of Folk Psychology, which he published in 1916. Wundt believed that empirical psychology could be used only for the study of mental ideas and simple mental processes, while claiming observational social psychology should be used to investigate complex mental processes. Hence, collective mental products are not included in Wundt’s experimental system of empirical psychology.
Hence, due to his endeavour to make empirical psychology more scientific, Wundt’s experimental system is limited and leaves large areas of the mental (cognitive and social) unaccounted for. These areas were, however, investigated by the majority of the approaches to empirical experimental psychology which followed Wundt, as it will be shown in the following chapters. Likewise, factors such as social conformity, social influence, social compliance, obedience, dependence, mutual benefit, binding and the like, which constitute classic mental products in the Wundtian sense, have since been studied in a controlled, empirical manner in a laboratory; see the classic studies of Asch (1951, 1955, 1956, 1958); Sherif (1958); Bandura (1973, 1977); and Milgram (1963, 1968, 1974) as an illustration.
Consequently, while Wundt established the field of empirical psychology as an independent field, between philosophy and physiology, by making it an empirical, experimental, scientific study of mental life, thus detaching it from metaphysics, his methods of introspection and controlled observation of introspective data are now considered limited, subjective, invalid and unreliable. Moreover, Wundt’s subject matter is a philosophical one (conscious experiences), despite of his endeavour to produce empirical terminology and subject matters (immediate experiences of objects of experiences), his method of introspection is a physiological one and the experiencing subject as an independent, unique being who lives and acts in an environment is disregarded by the Wundtian system.
Wundt’s system of empirical psychology has been regarded in the field of empirical psychology as outdated and has been shown to be irrelevant and erroneous. Wundt’s importance and relevance have therefore been considered to be merely historical. Wundt is now known for having removed psychology from the domain of abstract, metaphysical, nineteenth century philosophy, in which it had been immersed as a sub-domain, by establishing an independent empirical psychology. This releases empirical psychology from its historical confinement to the subjective metaphysical issues and methods, making it more objective.
The positivistic approach became more and more radicalized, until some social scientists rebelled. A new model, or paradigm was formed, of qualitative and post-positivism.
The Social constructionists and post-structuralists argued that the quantification of the study of human phenomena and conducting experimentation on them reduce and dehumanize the human subject. They sought to study them in their natural environment of social interactions, conversations and discourse.
But let us avoid the either or and the fight to the death between quantitative and qualitative.
Let us formulate suitable questions for enquiry - reflection and dialogue - for instance
How do we study human phenomena in a rigorous, systematic manner that is also natural (as it happens naturally)?
let us reflect and dialogue on this question and try to answer it in a manner that transforms rather than dismisses and outweigh the other viewpoint.
let us test our answers and scrutinize it and test it in order to transform and improve it.
Wundt, W. (1873). Grunduzge der physiologischen Psychologie. Engelmann. Leipzig. Translated in 1904 by E. B. Titchener as The Principles of Physiological Psychology. MacMillan. New York
Wundt, W. (1916). Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of A Psychological History of the Development of Mankind. George Allen and Unwin. London.
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Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American, 193 (5)., 31-35.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of Independence and Conformity. A Minority of One Against An Unanimous Majority. Psychological Monographs, 70 (Whole No. 416.).
Asch, S. E. (1958). Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments. In Maccoby, E. E. Newcomb, T. M. & Hartley, E. L. (Eds.). Readings in Social Psychology. (Third Ed.). Holts, Rhinehart and Winston. New York, pp 174-183.
Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression : A Social Learning Analysis. Holts, Rhinehart and Winston. New York.
Bandura, A. (1977). Social Learning Theory. Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. Harper and Row. New York.
Sherif, S. (1958). Group Influences Upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes. In Maccoby, E. E. Newcomb, T. M. & Hartley, E. L. (Eds.). Readings in Social Psychology. (Third Ed). Holts, Rhinehart and Winston. New York. pp 219-232